Interview with Former US Ambassador to Greece, Charles Ries, in "To Vima," on the occasion of his Participation in the «Dialogue Bridges».
Ambassador Charles Ries, former U.S. Ambassador to Greece, Adjunct Senior Fellow RAND Corporation and expert on the State Department and the region, granted an interview to the newspaper To Vima, explaining the implications of the outcome of the American elections for our wider region and internationally.
Mr. Ries spoke, among other things, about the foreign policy of both American candidates and their possible actions regarding the management of the wars on the Middle East Front and in Ukraine.
Next Friday, the American diplomat who in 2008, at the behest of then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, hastily left his post in Greece and was posted to Baghdad to oversee the economic reconstruction of Iraq, will be back in Athens to participate in an event organized by “Georgios M. Mihalos Foundation” on the topic: "The US Elects a New President – The Day After for the Eastern Mediterranean".
What will the election of Mr. Trump mean for the war in Gaza-Lebanon and also in Ukraine?
The election of former President Trump would be more consequential to the war in Ukraine, though it would affect both conflicts.
Mr. Trump has said repeatedly that if he would be elected, he would end the war in Ukraine “in one day.” He has not been specific on how he would do this, but observers expect him to convoke Russia and Ukraine to negotiate an end to hostilities, with Ukrainian agreement obtained by a cutoff, or threatened cutoff, in U.S. military assistance if the Ukrainian side were to be uncooperative. Such an imposed settlement might well deprive Ukraine of the territory taken thus far by Russia, and, consistent with its expressed war aims, Russia would seek provisions guaranteeing that Ukraine would never join NATO. Such a settlement would worry many other eastern flank members of NATO, to say the least.
Mr. Trump’s election would be less consequential for the Gaza-Lebanon war in my view. The Israeli side is close to prevailing on their war aims to eliminate Hamas as a force in Gaza and to end Hezbollah’s targeting of Israeli communities (if not to eliminate Hezbollah itself). The current Israeli government led by Benjamin Netanyahu has been unwilling thus far to discuss the establishment of a horizon for Palestinian self-government committed to security and prosperity, even though the U.S., the EU, and Arab states believe such a horizon could hold the key to sustainable peace. Such an Israeli attitude would likely have Trump’s support if he were elected. Mr. Trump may also be more hands-off than the Biden team has been in the effort to improve humanitarian supplies and obtain a cease-fire and hostage release agreement.
What policies will the re-elected president launch in relation to NATO?
Apart from the Ukraine war termination issue discussed earlier, I would expect that, if the former President again would take office, his emphasis would again be to urge NATO members to dedicate more funding to defense expenditures. In any case, that has been a focus for NATO ever since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This year a majority of NATO members (including of course Greece) have met the target of 2% of GDP for defense. Trump may also be more responsive to Russian complaints about American troop deployments in Europe.
What will Ms. Harris do if elected US president on the Middle East and Ukraine front?
If Vice President Harris is elected, I would expect U.S. policy towards the Ukraine conflict to be similar to that of the current Biden administration. That means support for Ukrainian sovereignty, a continuation of supply of critical military materiel and economic assistance, in close consultation with EU and NATO partners.
A Harris administration would also be expected to continue the Biden administration’s policies in the Gaza and Lebanon/Hezbollah conflicts: support and understanding for Israel’s need to eliminate malign terrorist forces and secure return of hostages, while seeking an end to violence and a better future for Israelis and Palestinians alike, based on the longstanding vision of two states committed to peace, prosperity, and security.
Who benefited geopolitically after the start of the war in Gaza?
At first, it seemed to some as if the war would benefit Iran and its proxies. But it has not turned out that way. Israel’s Abraham Accords partners, while supportive of the two-state vision for Palestine, have not abandoned Israel. Hezbollah, which launched cross-border attacks out of sympathy for Hamas (and likely at the urging of Iran), has been greatly weakened. The Iranian-led so-called ‘Axis of Resistance’ has been the biggest loser, and other regional powers, including the U.S. have benefited.
How will the balance change after a possible strike by Israel on Iran and continuation of the war in the Middle East?
I would not expect the balance of power to change significantly if Israel should retaliate for Iranian attacks against it.
What should be done to ensure Europe's energy self-sufficiency while the war in Ukraine continues?
Europe should continue to seek a balanced, secure, and climate-conscious energy strategy regardless of developments in the war in Ukraine. But the war in Ukraine has illustrated the risks of dependence on major energy imports from insecure sources. Renewables, new safe nuclear generation, LNG terminals, new storage concepts, and strong energy efficiency strategies (including for buildings) can all play important roles. Azerbaijan, Georgia, Romania and Hungary are even teaming up on an electricity transmission line under the Black Sea.
What role should Greece play in the energy sector in the Eastern Mediterranean?
Greece is playing a critical role in strengthening energy security in the Eastern Mediterranean. Its support for competitive pipelines connecting new Mediterranean gas discoveries to European markets; its promotion of north-south energy and transport corridors to Eastern Europe and Italy, where Azerbaijan has committed to double gas volumes by 2027; its LNG terminals and connections to secure LNG suppliers such as the U.S.; and its vision in transforming its own electricity generation by capturing its ample solar and wind endowments all play important roles in this better future.
How damaging can Turkey's energy ambitions in the region and the role it aspires to play in the energy sector in the Middle East turn out to be?
Turkey’s energy ambitions are understandable given the needs of its economy. But Turkey should tackle energy challenges in coordination with NATO, Europe, and others, and there is potential room for Turkey to contribute to energy production. In playing a role in the Southern Gas Corridor (from Azerbaijan to Italy), Turkey helps advance European energy security objectives, and as noted, partners in that effort have recently agreed to double volumes to 20 billion cubic meters annually. To the extent that Turkey seeks to supply insecure Russian gas via Turkstream to European and Eastern Mediterranean markets, however, it could undercut energy security objectives. Even if Turkey only continues to use large quantities of Russian gas in its own economy, it introduces vulnerabilities into the NATO alliance. Turkish construction companies have long played a significant role in building energy facilities in the Gulf, but these are under the ownership and management of the countries of the region.
NATO must react to the agreements between Tayyip Erdoğan and Vladimir Putin for nuclear investments in Turkey for the nuclear plant in Akuyu? The plant will be located near the Incirlik base and thus near NATO facilities.
Turkey, as a NATO member, as a NATO member, has an obligation to be transparent and forthcoming on its sensitive dealings with Russia. Security issues must be discussed in the appropriate Alliance forums. I am not privy to details. The Incirlik facility is a Turkish base which allows some NATO countries access under very specific and limited conditions.
Which are NATO's challenges in the current unstable geopolitical context?
NATO’s challenges are the same as the always have been: to maintain Alliance cohesion and capabilities, and to adjust its strategic concept to the opportunities and risks that members face in today’s world. On the cohesion side, NATO members must stay in close coordination in assisting Ukraine resist unprovoked invasion by Russia. On the capabilities side, NATO forces need to modernize rapidly to cope with technological changes in war, including applications in war of artificial intelligence and autonomous aerial, terrestrial and naval vehicles.